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Abstract: We present a protocol developed by the ASPeCT project for secure billing that provides the
incontestable charging that is required for UMTS. This protocol realises a payment system for value
added services. We describe the protocol and in particular the design features that are of particular
relevance  to the UMTS environment. We also describe the configuration of a field trial of this protocol
over the experimental UMTS platform developed by the project EXODUS.
1 Introduction
In this paper we present a protocol for secure billing that can provide the incontestable charging
required for the third generation mobile communications system, also known in Europe as UMTS
(Universal Mobile Telecommunications System).  This protocol has been developed by the project
ASPeCT (Advanced Security for Personal Communications Technologies) and following successful
demonstration in 1997, the protocol will be tested in May 1998 in a field trial over the experimental
UMTS platform developed by the project EXODUS (Experiments on the Deployment of UMTS). The
protocol has been integrated at the application level (realising a payment system for value-added
services) rather than into the basic UMTS security services, but it has been designed in a way that
permits this development in the future. The demonstrator and the trial also take into account the
requirements of Trusted Third Parties (TTPs), and in particular the need for cross-certification
scenarios. In the following discussion we motivate both the goals of the protocol and the particular
design principles that make the protocol a particularly suitable candidate for providing electronic
commerce support in UMTS. We follow this with a short description of the protocol and then describe
the configuration of the field trial.
2 Motivation and Protocol Design 
2.1 Mobile Information Services
A significant difference between existing second generation telecommunications systems such as
GSM and future third generation systems such as UMTS will be the variety and number of value-
added services, such as on-line information services, that a user will be able to purchase over the
network. These services will be provided by an ever-increasing number of competing value-added
service providers (VASPs) who will in turn be serviced by a large number of different public and
private network operators. Within this complex mosaic of network relationships it is clear that there
exists a great need for incontestable charging procedures to permit payments for value-added services
to be made reliably and with minimal risk of fraud
2.2 Protocol Goals
The basic ASPeCT protocol for secure billing within UMTS operates between a mobile user and a
VASP. The ultimate goal of the protocol is to establish billing information that acts as incontestable
evidence that the user has committed to pay a certain amount for a valued-added service. We assume
that the actual payment claim, and ultimate billing of the user, takes place off-line with the assistance
of the user’s UMTS service provider and these processes are not a feature of the ASPeCT
demonstrators or trials. The protocol is in fact divided into two separate component protocols whose
goals we now describe.
2.2.1 Authentication and Initialisation Protocol
The two general aims of this protocol are to establish various degrees of authentication between the
user and the VASP and to initialise the subsequent payment protocol. More precisely some of the main
goals are:
• mutual explicit entity authentication (assurance that each entity is who they claim to be);
• mutual agreement on a secret session key;
• mutual implicit key authentication, key confirmation and key freshness (assurance that only the
other entity could possibly also know the agreed session key, assurance that the other entity
actually has possession of the agreed key, and assurance that it is a new key);
• non-repudiation by the user of initialisation information sent to the VASP;
• confidentiality of the user’s identity (at the interface between the user and the VASP).
2.2.2 Payment Protocol
The payment protocol describes a mechanism for making payments for a value-added service. The
goal is to establish an incontestable bill for the total amount due to the VASP (payee) by the user
(payer). More precisely some of the goals are:
• the user is assured that the amount of the payment will be precisely that specified on the bill and
that only the intended VASP can receive the payment;
• the VASP is assured that the user cannot deny having incurred the bill and can be certain of
receiving the exact amount of the payment specified on the bill.
• an external broker (probably the user’s UMTS service provider) can verify the correctness of the
bill in order to assist in the clearing of the payment.
2.3 Protocol Design Issues
The design of the ASPeCT protocol was directly targeted towards the UMTS environment. This
reflects itself in a number of important ways, which we now detail.
2.3.1 Protocol Scenario
The adopted protocol scenario is well suited to the mobile environment as the roles required can be
played by entities already active in current mobile networks, namely mobile users, mobile services
providers and VASPs. Their existing business relationships, in particular the existing infrastructure for
billing users for telecommunications services, can thus also be adopted for payment of value-added
services without the need for additional clearing network or financial institutions such as bank or
credit card organisations.
2.3.2 Authentication Mechanism
The authentication protocol between user and VASP is based on a protocol submitted to ETSI
(European Telecommunications Standards Institute) for user-to-network authentication [3]. The
significance of this is that the ASPeCT protocol can also be used for user-to-network authentication
and hence payment for value-added services and basic telecommunications services can be efficiently
combined by integrating the initialisation of payment process with call set-up procedures in UMTS.
2.3.3 Payment Mechanism
The fundamental design factor behind the payment mechanism is the recognition that the unit cost of
value-added services will be very low and hence communication and processing costs of charging for
such services must be kept to a minimum. Payment mechanisms for this type of transaction are often
known as micropayment schemes and have already been proposed for diverse applications such as
electronic publishing and video-on-demand. The micropayment technique adopted by ASPeCT is
based on the tick payment protocol of [10], (see also [1,4,8,11,12]). This mechanism was selected
because it is extremely lightweight and its initialisation could be incorporated naturally into the
proposed authentication process.
2.3.4 Cryptographic Technology
A significant difference between the cryptographic techniques used within ASPeCT and those used in
current telecommunications systems is the adoption of public key cryptographic techniques. While
these traditionally involve greater computational overheads, improvements in smart card technology
allow the exploitation of the increased flexibility and range of services that such technology can
provide. The cryptographic technology used in the ASPeCT protocol was primarily selected in order
to suit the low bandwidth and low computational capabilities on the user’s smart card. Some precise
reflections of this requirement include:
• use of digital signatures with small storage overhead (International Standard ISO/IEC 9796-2 [6]
and the elliptic curve signature scheme under consideration in ISO/IEC 14888-3 [7]);
• a message exchange system that concentrates all costly non pre-computable exponentiations at the
VASP end of the communication if the preferred elliptic curve signatures are used;
• use of elliptic curve cryptosystems to reduce the length of messages.
2.3.5 Public Key Infrastructure
Applying public key techniques in a complex network necessitates the existence of a public key
infrastructure (PKI). This includes TTPs who act as certification authorities (CAs) for entities such as
mobile users and VASPs (specifically, a TTP will produce a certificate which provides a guaranteed
link between the identity of an entity and a public key). The full version of the ASPeCT authentication
and initialisation protocol includes a message exchange between the VASP and the TTP of the user in
order to ensure that both the user and the VASP are able to verify the certificates of one another’s
public keys. Since the user and VASP may well be in different domains this involves the creation of
certificate chains. The specific TTP services and protocols used by ASPeCT are also targeted towards
UMTS. In particular, the certificate format has been chosen in order to minimise the storage space on
the smart card and the bandwidth of the air interface (a public-key certificate is less than 200 bytes,
which compares favourably with the 1Kbyte needed for a typical X.509 certificate).
3 Protocol Description
We provide a very brief description of the ASPeCT protocols here. For full details and explanations of
the working of the protocol see [5,9].
3.1 Prerequisites
All entities have access to a strong symmetric encryption function, where {M}K denotes the encryption
of M using key K. Functions h1,h2 and h3 are all implemented using the one-way hash function
RIPEMD-128 [2], but for their precise theoretical requirements see [5]. The VASP has a long term
secret/public key agreement pair (v,gv), where g is the generator of a finite group in which the Discrete
Logarithm Problem is hard.
3.2 Authentication and Initialisation Protocol
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Figure 1:  Authentication and Initialisation Protocol
The main steps of the authentication and initialisation protocol shown in Figure 1 are as follows. The
user generates a random number RNDU and sends a request AuthReq to the VASP, including the
identity of the user’s TTP and the user’s identity, encrypted by a key L computable by the TTP. The
VASP forwards most of this message along with its public key certificate in TTPReq. The TTP
replies to the VASP in TTPRes with several certificate chains (where CertChain(X,Y) allows entity X
to verify the certified public key of entity Y), a timestamp TT, key L and a signature on data that
includes two certificate identifiers. The VASP generates a random number RNDV and sends AuthCont
to the user, which includes the tariff information ch_data and the information necessary for the user to
compute the shared key K=h1((gRNDu)v||RNDv), all encrypted using key L. In AuthConf the user replies
by sending the VASP an encrypted signature on information that includes parameters IV and αT which
are needed to initialise the payment protocol. The VASP acknowledges receipt in AuthAck. This
protocol achieves all the goals specified in Section 2.2.1 (for details, see [5]).
3.3 Payment Protocol
The payment protocol assumes that during initialisation the VASP has received the values IV (a
random value selected by the user that identifies a one-way function FIV from a family of such one-
way functions), and the value αT=FIV T(α0) which is generated from a random value α0  generated by
the user. The user pays for units of service by releasing pre-images of αT.  The basic payment protocol
exchange is shown in Figure 2.
On receiving a demand for the first d units of payment (ticks) from the VASP, the user makes the
payment commitment by releasing the appropriate pre-image value α=FIV T- d(α0) , which the VASP
can easily verify by checking that αd=αT. To pay for the next d2 ticks the user will then commit with
the value α=FIV T- d-d2(α0), and so on. Once T ticks have been purchased then a re-initialisation process
must be run.
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Figure 2:  Payment Protocol
When the call session has ended the VASP stores the last received pre-image α and the number of
ticks consumed by the user during the current protocol run and composes and stores the transcript of
the charge ticks transaction, representing the bill to be later claimed. The information contained in the
transcript includes the signature received from the user in AuthConf of the initialisation protocol.
Again, for further details that the Payment Protocol achieves the goals of Section 2.2.2, see [5].
4 Trial Configuration
The configuration of the ASPeCT Secure Billing Trial is shown in Figure 3. The trial will run over the
EXODUS experimental UMTS platform. The three entities, mobile user, VASP and TTP, will be
implemented on three different devices, with fixed broadband access to the EXODUS network. The
TTP and secure billing software will reside on the EXODUS terminal personal computers. A software
interface will exist within the EXODUS terminal, which separates ASPeCT and EXODUS
functionality. The mobile user will implement some of the TTP and secure billing applications on a
smart card. The smart card reader will be connected to the EXODUS terminal via an RS-232 serial
interface. The ASPeCT demonstrator software consists partly of commercial applications using
Windows Sockets as the interface to the transport protocol. Note that the ASPeCT TTP and secure
billing demonstrator and the ASPeCT authentication demonstrator are not to be trialled simultaneously;
the user-to-network authentication will be switched off during the TTP and secure billing trial. It is
hoped that a first evaluation of the field trial results will be available by the middle of 1998.
On the VASP terminal a WWW server application will provide a value-added information service to
trial users. The trial users at the user terminal will use a WWW browser application to retrieve HTML
documents that are of particular interest to them using the HTTP protocol. As soon as the browser
connects to the server, the ASPeCT payment application on the user terminal will connect to the
ASPeCT payment application on the VASP terminal. They will then execute the authentication and
initialisation of payment protocol, assuring each other's identity and establishing all the data needed
for the charge protocol to be executed and for the on-line credit-based payment of the retrieved
information. In the course of this protocol the user's smart card is required. In return for the requested
information, the server payment application asks the user for a payment. The user’s payment
application responds to this request by making the payment. In the window of the payment application
on the user PC and on the VASP PC, all relevant information about the information service and the
secure billing protocols associated with the current session are displayed. All this information is also
stored in the user’s log file so he can check how much money he spent in all his sessions. The exercise
of error conditions and error messages resulting from certificate problems (revoked, out of date etc.) is
not included in the trial scenario for the users, but will be included in a separate demonstration.
EXODUS Terminal
EXODUS Terminal
EXODUS Terminal
smartcard
reader
Trusted Third Party
Value-added
Service Provider
(VASP)
EXODUS
Network
Mobile User
smartcard
Figure 3: Trial configuration
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